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Free Trade Versus Protection in the Early Third 
Republic: Economic Interests, Tariff Policy, 
and the Making of the Republican Synthesis 
Michael S. Smith 
The founding of the Third Republic coincided with the creation of a 
particular political and economic arrangement which Stanley 
Hoffmann has variously called the "Republican synthesis" and the 
"Republican equilibrium." This arrangement stabilized French soci- 
ety in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, perhaps to the 
point of"stalemate," but in any case it enabled the Third Republic to 
survive longer than any other French regime since 1789. Because it 
ultimately rested on the support of the bourgeoisie and the peasantry, 
its formation depended on forging those elements of society into a 
"Republican consensus" (again Hoffmann's term) by the accommo- 
dation of their interests-that is to say, by the formulation of policies 
which preserved and enhanced their social and economic position.' 
The process of accommodating interests and building the Re- 
publican consensus unfolded at several levels between the late 1860s 
and the 1890s.2 From the beginning, the making of tariff policy was a 
crucial part of this process, especially for big businessmen and farm- 
ers. Yet it proved to be one of the hardest areas in which to reach an 
agreement. Contrary to conventional wisdom, there was no popularly 
mandated scuttling of Napoleon III's free trade policies and no 
return to protection after 1870. To be sure, there was a noisy reaction 
Michael S. Smith is assistant professor of history at the University of South Carolina. 
1 Hoffmann first articulated his conception of the Republican synthesis in In Search of 
France (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 3-21. He subsequently refined it in Decline or Renewal? 
France since the 1930s (New York, 1974), pp. 403-12, 443-49. 
2 For an introduction to this process, albeit written from a different point of view and with 
a different vocabulary, see Sanford Elwitt, The Making of the Third Republic: Class and Politics in 
France, 1868-1884 (Baton Rouge, 1975). This work is especially useful for defining the various 
policy areas-public works, education, economic policy, colonization-which were involved in 
the process of accommodation. 
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against the trade treaties, beginning even before the fall of the Second 
Empire and peaking under the presidency of Adolphe Thiers, but in 
a series of parliamentary battles, first in the Corps legislatif and then 
in the National Assembly, this reaction was thwarted.3 For the time 
being France remained under the existing system. However, the 
permanent orientation of policy under the Third Republic was still to 
be determined. Already, during the reaction protectionniste of 1868- 
1873, the major economic interests of the country had divided into 
two rival camps on this issue. On one side were the so-called free 
traders (libre-echangistes), who demanded, at the very least, the preser- 
vation of the trade treaties that had eliminated or greatly reduced 
duties on almost all imports; on the other side were the protectionists 
who demanded the abrogation of all trade treaties and the enactment 
of high import duties. Once mobilized, these two groups fought 
almost continuously for the next twenty years to decide if France 
would return to high protection, maintain the moderate free trade 
policies of Napoleon III, or even move toward more complete free 
trade. In doing so, they posed a serious obstacle to the creation of the 
Republican consensus. Indeed, it can be argued that such a consensus 
was possible only when the conflict between the free traders and 
protectionists was resolved. In any case, it should be clear that no one 
can fully understand the process of accommodation, the formation of 
the Republican consensus, and thus the establishment of the Republi- 
can synthesis without first understanding the conflict on tariffs-who 
was involved, what they represented, and how they settled their 
differences. To provide such an understanding is the purpose of this 
article. 
Who exactly were the protectionists and free traders? This can be 
ascertained, with proper recognition of the people who actually par- 
ticipated in the conflict and with proper emphasis on the interests 
having the greatest weight and the largest stake in the matter, 
through an examination of the parliamentary blocs which emerged in 
opposition to, or support of, the trade treaties between 1868 and 
1873. For, with certain exceptions, the structure and composition of 
each "party" established at that time remained intact throughout the 
struggle. 
The protectionist bloc materialized in the Corps legislatif during 
3 See Arthur Louis Dunham, The Anglo-French Treaty of Commerce of 1860 and the Progress of 
the Industrial Revolution in France (An i Arbor, 1930), pp. 294-319, and my unpublished 
doctoral dissertation, Michael S. Smith, "Free Trade, Protection, and Tariff Reform: Com- 
merce and Industry in French Politics, 1868-1882" (Cornell University, 1972), pp. 13-78. 
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the preparation of two interpellations against the trade treaties. The 
first of these, sponsored in April 1868 by four prominent protec- 
tionist spokesmen-Adolphe Thiers, Jules Brame and Charles 
Kolb-Bernard of Lille, and Augustin Pouyer-Quertier of Rouen- 
sought to discredit the treaties by linking them to the ongoing indus- 
trial depression. The second, sponsored by Brame alone in December 
1869, sought to force the incoming Ollivier government to renounce 
the treaty with England. Both ultimately failed to alter French trade 
policy. However, sixty-three deputies-one fourth of the Corps 
legislatif-signed one or both of the two interpellations. In the ab- 
sence of formal party membership lists or useful roll call votes, their 
signatures represent the best available guide to the composition of the 
protectionist bloc in parliament and also give the best available indi- 
cation of what interests were protectionist at the end of the Second 
Empire and at the outset of the Third Republic. As such, they form 
the basis of the following portrait of the protectionist "party."4 
In examining the signers of the interpellations, one is first struck 
by the relative absence of agriculturalists or their representatives. 
Only four signers of the 1868 interpellation had direct connections to 
agriculture: baron de Janze, an important livestock breeder of the 
Cotes-du-Nord,Jules Brame and the baron des Rotours of the Nord, 
both of whom were involved in sugar beet cultivation, and FranCois 
Malezieux of the Aisne, a Saint-Quentin lawyer and agronomist who 
wrote for the Annales de l'agriculture franqaise.5 Somewhat more ag- 
riculturalist deputies signed the 1869 interpellation, but many of 
France's most characteristically agrarian departments nevertheless 
remained unrepresented in the interpellations. In the case of those 
that were represented, mainly of northern and western France, the 
signatory often turned out to be an industrialist, not an agricul- 
turalist.6 All this indicates that in the late 1860s most of French 
4 The signatories of the 1868 interpellation were listed in the Journal des economistes (May, 
1868), pp. 315-16; signatories of the 1869 interpellation were listed in theJournal officiel de 
l'Empire franrais (December 15, 1869), p. 1628. The geographical distribution of both is 
depicted on p. 310. These lists may be supplemented by the membership lists of the later 
protectionist lobby, the Association de l'industrie francaise, founded in 1878. An analysis of 
those lists yields a picture of the protectionist party very similar to the one developed here on 
the basis of the interpellations. Smith, "Free Trade, Protection, and Tariff Reform," pp. 
208-47. 
5 Here and throughout, the information on the economic interests of deputies is derived 
chiefly, but not exclusively, from Adolphe Robert, Edgar Bourloton, and Gaston Cougny, 
eds., Dictionnaire des parlementaires fran(ais, 5 vols. (Paris, 1891). 
6 For example, Leclerc d'Osmonville, deputy for the Mayenne and signer of both interpel- 
lations, was a coal mine operator. Ernest Carre-Kerisouit, who signed the 1869 interpellation 
as deputy for the Morbihan, was a maitre de forges. 
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agriculture was indifferent to the siren song of protectionism. Indeed 
the peasant farmers of the interior were still largely immune to 
foreign competition because of the incompleteness of the railway 
system and thus had no fear of trade treaties, while the commercial 
farmers of the periphery-the winegrowers of the Bordelais and 
Languedoc and the wheat growers of the West and North-were 
shipping more and more produce to foreign markets and thus ben- 
efitted from the trade treaties. Not surprisingly, the Societe des 
agriculteurs, formed in 1868 to promote the interests of commercial 
agriculture, consistently supported the economic policies of the Sec- 
ond Empire, and its general secretary, Emile Lecouteux, repeatedly 
warned farmers against joining in any alliance with industrial protec- 
tionists.7 Most were following his advice at the end of the sixties and 
would continue to do so until the agragrian crisis of the early 
eighties. 
At the outset of the Third Republic, the real strength of protec- 
tionism therefore lay in industry, which is not to say that all indus- 
trialists were protectionists. Further examination of the signers of the 
interpellations reveals that most were linked to mining, metallurgy, 
and textiles and, most specifically, to certain subdivisions of those 
industries located primarily in northern France, in an arc from Nor- 
mandy to Alsace, and secondarily in central France. 
Within mining and metallurgy, it was particularly the coal and 
coke iron industries of the North and the charcoal iron industry, 
politically important in the East, which supported tariff protection 
and supplied backers for the interpellations. The coal and iron pro- 
ducers of the Nord and Pas-de-Calais faced stiff competition from the 
British and the Belgians locally and in the Paris market and, quite 
naturally, the deputies drawn from their midst, including Thiers and 
Felix Lambrecht of Anzin, Rene Hamoir and August Stievenart of 
Valenciennes, and Alexandre Pinart of the Marquise ironworks 
(Pas-de-Calais), took the lead in attacking the treaties. Equally promi- 
nent in this attack were various representatives of thefer au bois 
industry, led by baron Lesperut of Saint-Dizier. They and other 
maitres de forges who smelted or refined iron with charcoal were 
plagued by fixed or rising production costs in an age of falling prices, 
and they unanimously favored a return to high protection as a means 
of keeping prices up.8 On the other hand, there was no unanimity on 
7 See, for instance, Emile Lecouteux, "Les traites de commerce et les tarifs," Journal 
d'agriculture pratique, 1869 (2), p. 903. 
8 On the plight of the charcoal iron industry in the 1860s, see Bertrand Gille, La siderurgie 
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the issue of tariffs and trade treaties among the mining and metal- 
lurgical enterprises of central France. Some of the most technolog- 
ically advanced companies of the region, including Le Creusot and 
Terrenoire, found that the trade treaties opened up new markets for 
them in Central Europe. Indeed, they were coming to depend on 
those markets for sale of their principal products-rails and railroad 
equipment-in the late sixties. Consequently their directors sup- 
ported the treaties at that time, and would continue to do so until the 
late seventies. Other firms of the region, however, could not or would 
not enter these foreign markets and continued to depend on domes- 
tic markets. Since, from their point of view, the trade treaties only 
served to open those markets to foreign competition, their directors, as 
deputies, favored renunciation of the treaties. These included 
Louis-Jules Chagot of Blanzy, Christophe Mony of Commentry- 
Fourchambault, and Pierre Dorian of J. Holtzer et cie.9 
The second major group involved in the interpellations and in 
the protectionist party consisted of certain textile manufacturers: flax 
and hemp spinners, the draps makers of Elbeuf and Sedan, and above 
all the cotton manufacturers of Normandy, the Nord and the East. 
Because of their vulnerability to British competition, thefilateurs and 
tisseurs de coton of Normandy and the Nord had long been committed to 
high protection and were implacable foes of the trade treaties from 
their inception. Naturally those of them sitting in the Corps legislatif, 
including Pouyer-Quertier and Eugene Cosserat of Amiens, sup- 
ported the campaign against the trade treaties in 1868-70. So, too, did 
virtually all other representatives of the cotton districts of Normandy 
and the Nord, whether or not they had personal ties to cotton. 
Likewise, almost all representatives of Normandy and the Nord in 
parliament later on, from the late seventies to the turn of the century, 
would continue to participate in the protectionist bloc under the 
leadership of Pouyer-Quertier and Richard Waddington of Rouen. 
francaise au XIXesiecle (Geneva, 1968), pp. 216-22, 233-79. See also the testimony before later 
parliamentary enquetes of Honore Reverchon and Paul Aclocque, who succeeded Lesperut as 
chief spokesmen for the industry in the 1870s. Senat, Proces-verbaux de la Commission d'enquete 
sur les souffrances du commerce et de l'industrie et sur les moyens d'y porter remede (Versailles, 1878), 
pp. 307-12, 326-28, and Chambre des deputes, Commission du tarif gienral des douanes, 
Proces-verbaux des seances (Paris, 1878), pp. 464-70. 
9 These firms' specific grievances against the trade treaties depended, of course, on their 
specific circumstances. J. Holtzer et Cie, for example, specialized in the making of high quality 
steel for cutlery and armaments. In the 1860s it was competing with Sheffield in supplying 
steel to the Cherbourg arsenal, which naturally contributed to Dorian's opposition to the 
treaty with England. Holtzer dossier, AN F12 5169. For the overall response of the grandes 
societes metallurgiques to the trade treaties, see Gille, La siderurgie francaise, pp. 229-32. 
297 
FRENCH HISTORICAL STUDIES 
In both periods in both regions, it would have been political suicide to 
do otherwise.10 
In contrast to the unanimous support for tariff protection found 
in the cotton industries of western and northern France, the cotton 
industry of eastern France was divided on the tariff at the end of the 
Second Empire. While spinners and weavers in the East were typically 
protectionist, the cloth printers of Mulhouse, who had founded and 
long controlled the industry, imported cloth and yarn from abroad 
and exported finished indiennes and therefore favored free trade. 
Under the leadership of Jean Dollfus, they managed to keep Alsace 
and the neighboring departments on the side of the government and 
its trade treaties through 1868. As a result, the only deputies of the 
region to sign the 1868 interpellation were J-B Lefebure, a calicot 
manufacturer, and Renouard de Bussiere and the baron de Coehorn, 
Strasbourg bankers heavily invested in cotton spinning. Between the 
spring of 1868 and the spring of 1869, however, the political balance 
in Alsace shifted dramatically. Threatened by economic depression 
and the resultant worker unrest, the spinners and weavers success- 
fully engineered the election of a protectionist slate to parliament in a 
bitter campaign in May 1869.11 Consequently, the Alsatian legislative 
delegation, which had all but ignored the 1868 interpellation, signed 
Brame's interpellation en masse in December 1869. Of course, later 
when Alsace was lost and the center of gravity of the eastern cotton 
industry shifted from Mulhouse to the spinning and weaving towns of 
the Vosges, its commitment to protection deepened, and the rep- 
resentatives of the industry in parliament, especially Jules Meline, 
increasingly played a leading role in the attack on the trade treaties. 
This turn of events in eastern France certainly reflected a 
broadening of protectionist sentiment within the French cotton in- 
dustry and meant that, by the early 1870s, the segments of that 
industry in northern France, from Normandy to the Vosges, were 
unified in opposing free trade policies. However, other segments of 
the cotton industry and, most importantly, other whole textile 
industries-notably silk and worsteds-did not follow their lead but 
rather stood firmly by the trade treaties. Thus it must again be 
10 For the economic basis of protectionism in these segments of the cotton industry in the 
1860s, consult Claude Fohlen, L'Industrie textile au temps du Second Empire (Paris, 1956). For a 
glimpse of the later activities of industrialists and politicians of the Nord and Normandy in the 
matter of the tariff, consult Senat, Procbs-verbaux de la Commission d'enquete and Chambre des 
deputes, Commission du tarif general des douanes, Proces-verbaux des siances. 
1 F. L'Huillier, "Une bataille economique au sein de la bourgeoisie industrielle sous le 
Second Empire," in La Bourgeoisie alsacienne (2nd ed. Strasbourg, 1967), pp. 427-29. 
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emphasized that, while the protectionists drew their support mainly 
from industry, they hardly represented all industrialists, even within 
mining, metallurgy, and textiles. 
If the preceding analysis shows that the protectionist party was 
narrower in its composition and more limited in its appeal at the 
outset of the Third Republic than is usually thought, a similar analysis 
of the free trade party shows that it was broader in its appeal and 
more diverse in its composition than is usually thought. (Actually, 
most historians have ignored its existence altogether.) The basis for 
such an analysis is found in the membership of a parliamentary 
caucus, the Reunion des deputes partisans de la liberte commerciale, 
which was formed under the auspices of the Societe d'economie 
politique in 1871 to resist Thiers's attempt to effect a return to high 
protection. The membership of the caucus amounted to only twenty 
or thirty deputies at its first meeting in April. However, by August, 
when Thiers's plans for the raw materials tax and the renunciation of 
the trade treaties had surfaced, it had risen to 180, and it remained 
at that level henceforth, as indicated in the roll call votes on various 
facets of the tariff question in 1872. Its composition is perhaps best 
revealed in the vote on a motion against trade treaty renunciation 
made by Nathaniel Johnston, deputy for Bordeaux, in February 
1872. An examination of the 196 deputies who supported Johnston's 
motion, when combined with the information in the published ac- 
counts of the early meetings of the caucus, allows one to reconstruct 
the personnel, leadership, and interests of the free trade party in the 
early 1870s.12 
Any discussion of the membership of the free trade caucus and 
of the party as a whole must surely begin with the Parisians and the 
Lyonnais. With Leon Say, deputy for the Seine, serving as president 
of the caucus; with Henri Germain, head of the Credit Lyonnais and 
deputy for the Ain, serving as vice-president; with Eugene Flottard, 
deputy for the Rhone, serving as secretary; and, moreover, with some 
12 On the early meetings of the caucus, sources are Annales de la Societe d'economie politique, 
IX (1871-72), 54ff, and G. Renaud, "Les nouveaux imp6ts discutes a la reunion des deputes 
libre-echangistes," Journal des economistes (February, 1872), p. 232. The roll call vote on the 
Johnston motion-the geographical distribution of which is shown on page 311-appeared in 
the Journal officiel de la Rkpublique franQaise (February 2, 1872), pp. 763-64. 
In addition, the picture of the economic interests in the free trade party, drawn here from 
their parliamentary representatives, is confirmed by an analysis of the membership of the free 
trade lobby, the Association pour la defense de la liberte commerciale, formed to offset the 
appearance of the protectionist lobby in 1878. See its membership list in AN F12 6385, repro- 
duced in Smith, "Free Trade, Protection, and Tariff Reform," pp. 411-12. 
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twenty-five deputies of the Seine and Seine-et-Oise and over thirty 
deputies of the Rhone and its six neighboring departments voting in 
favor of Johnston's motion, it is clear that the caucus and the party 
turned on a Paris-Lyon axis. 
The Parisian contingent in the caucus was actually made up of 
three different groups. One consisted of "radical" Republican politi- 
cians who, even as they rejected the Second Empire as a political 
system, continued to support its tariff policy to hold down consumer 
prices, especially on foodstuffs, for their working and middle class 
constituents. Their leader was Leon Gambetta, whose views on tariffs 
were spelled out from time to time throughout the seventies in the 
Republiquefranaaise.13 Also influential were Pierre Pascal-Duprat, who 
vigorously defended the trade treaties in 1872, and Pierre Tirard, 
who would eventually play a key role as commerce minister in the 
renegotiation of the trade treaties in 1881.14 However, others in this 
group, such as Louis Blanc and Henri Brisson, gave most of their 
attention to issues other than tariff and thus remained on the fringes 
of the caucus, their participation known only by their presence in the 
pro-trade treaty column in roll call votes. Consequently, the Radicals 
were not nearly as important for the activities of the caucus as was a 
second group of Parisian free traders, the professional economists. 
As disciples of Adam Smith through J-B Say and Adolphe Blan- 
qui, the French political economists found in the various grandes ecoles 
and faculties of Paris had naturally long supported free trade on 
principle. Moreover, they had long been acting on these principles. 
Since the 1840s they had campaigned tirelessly in the press and 
learned journals, through organizations like the Societe d'economie 
politique and through their positions in parliament and other gov- 
ernment bodies, to bring about the liberalization of French economic 
policy.15 These efforts, of course, had culminated in the reforms of 
the 1860s, and in the early 1870s many veterans of this campaign 
were still active, trying to preserve and broaden these reforms. They 
included Joseph Garnier, editor of theJournal des economistes, Hippo- 
13 The Republiquefrangaise was particularly outspoken on economic issues in the spring of 
1878. See the editorials in the issues of May 19, 21, and 30, and June 3. These were probably 
drafted by Maurice Rouvier, the paper's economic specialist, but they undoubtedly reflected 
Gambetta's views. J. P. T. Bury, Gambetta and the Making of the Third Republic (London, 1973), p. 
58. 
14 An early version of Tirard's free trade views, molded by his involvement in the jewelry 
business, is found in Pierre Tirard, Liberte du commerce. Du developpement de la bijouterie et de 
l'orfevrerie par la liberte des titres de l'or et de l'argent (Paris, 1868). 
15 This campaign may be traced in the monthly issues of the Journal des economistes, the 
"official" publication of the political economists after 1842. 
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lyte Passy, the long time president of the Societe d'economie 
politique, Louis Wolowski, professor at the Conservatoire des arts et 
metiers, and, of course, Michel Chevalier, professor at the College de 
France and father of the Anglo-French trade treaty. These, in turn, 
were supported by a rising new generation of political economists, 
which included Chevalier's son-in-law, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, profes- 
sor at the newly opened Ecole libre des sciences politiques, Louis 
Passy, Hippolyte's nephew and Wolowski's son-in-law, an economic 
journalist and politician, and Emile Levasseur, soon to replace 
Wolowski at the Conservatoire. Within the National Assembly and 
the free trade caucus, the group was represented by Wolowski, deputy 
for the Seine, and Louis Passy, deputy for the Eure, but real leader- 
ship of the group would soon pass to Leroy-Beaulieu who after 1873 
served as editor of the Economistefrangais, the free traders' new organ 
of propaganda. 
The third and probably the most important group of Parisians in 
the free trade caucus consisted of capitalists in international trade, 
finance, and transport. By the 1870s Paris was firmly established as a 
center for the import of foreign commodities into France, for the 
transshipment of central European goods moving westward, and 
especially for the export of various French manufactures. These 
manufactures ranged from the luxury items and novelties known 
collectively as articles de Paris, which ranked as France's fourth leading 
export in 1869,16 to the heavy railroad equipment constructed by the 
Societe des Batignolles at Saint-Ouen for customers worldwide. Nat- 
urally the merchants, merchant-bankers, and industrialists who pre- 
sided over this diverse trade, such as Henri Fould and Ernest Gouin,17 
wanted to keep tariff barriers low, both at home and abroad, and they 
therefore strongly supported the trade treaties throughout the 1870s 
through the Chamber of Commerce of Paris.18 In this they were 
joined by the owners and managers of France's railroad and steam- 
ship companies, including Adolphe d'Eichthal and the Pereire 
brothers, who also operated out of the capital. These men were free 
16 Emile Levasseur, Histoire du commerce de la France, 2 vols. (Paris, 1911-12) II, 755. 
17 Henri Fould, head of Fould Freres, commissionnaires en marchandises, exported about 15 
million francs' worth of articles de Paris per year, approximately one-tenth of all French exports 
of those items. Fould dossier, AN F'2 5148. As head of the Societe des Batignolles, Ernest Gouin 
was exporting railroad locomotives and tenders to Brazil, the Austrian Empire, and other 
countries. Moreover, because much of the iron and steel for the manufacture of those items was 
being imported duty-free under the admissions temporaires ystem, he had two reasons to support 
the existing tariff policy. Gouin et Cie dossier, AN F'2 2582. 
18 See, for example, the resolution of August 16, 1877, Chambre de commerce de Paris, 
Avis (Paris, 1878), pp. 149-225. 
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traders because, in many cases, they too were involved in interna- 
tional trade as merchant bankers and because, in all cases, they 
realized that the success and profitability of French transport de- 
pended at that moment on expanding long-haul (i.e., international) 
traffic.19 But whatever the specific reasons, it is obvious that Parisian 
enterprise in all its variety-commerce, banking, transport, manufac- 
ture for export-benefitted from and was committed to the economic 
policies of the Second Empire. It is therefore not surprising that the 
Paris capitalists in the National Assembly joined the free trade caucus. 
These included the financiers Alfred Andre, deputy for the Seine, 
and Leopold Javal, deputy for the Yonne; Eugene Caillaux, adminis- 
trator of the Chemin de fer de l'Ouest and deputy for the Sarthe; and, 
of course, the president of the caucus, Leon Say, grandson of the 
founder of French political economy, son of a leader of Parisian haut 
commerce, and himself a director of the Compagnie du chemin de fer 
du Nord.20 
As in Paris, free trade was good business in the industrial and 
commercial complex of the Rhone and its neighboring departments, 
which centered on Lyon and, secondarily, on Saint-Etienne. All the 
major sectors of this region's economy were represented at Versailles 
and in the free trade caucus. From textiles came Nicolas Ducarre, a 
drap manufacturer and a deputy for the Rhone; from banking and 
international trade came Eugene Flottard, an administrator of the 
Banque de France branch at Saint-Etienne, and three directors of the 
Credit Lyonnais: Henri Germain, Alexandre Jullien (deputy for the 
Loire), and J-B Ferrouillat (Var). Flottard and Jullien also rep- 
resented the mining and metallurgical interests of the region, as did 
Adrien de Montgolfier, deputy for the Loire and the future director 
of the Forges et acieries de la Marine. 
Textile manufacture was the area's biggest industry. Lyon and its 
environs produced various forms of tissus de soie and tissus melanges; 
ribbon was woven around Saint-Etienne; Tarare and Roanne pro- 
duced renowned muslins. All this production was geared to foreign 
markets, especially the English and American. Indeed, some 350 
million of the 460 million francs' worth of silks manufactured around 
Lyon in 1873 were sent abroad, thereby constituting by far France's 
19 The growing dependence of the railroad companies on international trade, which 
fostered their interest in free trade, was also reflected in their efforts to set up a rate structure 
that would allow them to capture international, long-haul traffic. See Andre Lefevre, Sous le 
Second Empire: chemins defer et politique (Pa 'is, 1951), pp. 119-68. 
20 Joseph Valynseele, Les Say et leurs alliances (Paris, 1971), pp. 61-66. 
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single most valuable export.21 Naturally the trade treaties, particu- 
larly the treaty with England, were considered indispensable for 
preserving these foreign sales. They were also considered indispens- 
able because the textile industries imported most of their raw materi- 
als. Since the silkworm blight hit the Rhone valley in the 1850s, Lyon 
had received most of its silk from the Orient, while the fine cotton 
yarn woven into Lyon's tissus melanges, Saint-Etienne's ribbon, and 
Tarare's muslin came from England after 1860. Consequently, by 
keeping French duties on these materials at a minimum, the trade 
treaties served to keep production costs low and thus to maintain the 
industries' competitive edge in the world market and their high 
profits. Not surprisingly the textile manufacturers continued to sup- 
port the treaties zealously in the 1870s.22 
The tariff system of the Second Empire was no less important to 
the merchant bankers of the region, most of whom started as mar- 
chands de soie and continued to run Lyon's lucrative silk trade in the 
1870s, but who, since the 1860s, had increasingly invested in growth 
industries such as coal, gas, chemicals, and metallurgy.23 Curiously, 
while most mining and metallurgical concerns elsewhere in France 
opposed the trade treaties, those in the Loire-Rhone area benefitted 
from them, so that the Lyonnais capitalists who were becoming in- 
volved in coal, iron, and steel found that these interests reinforced 
rather than undercut their free trade tendencies. One can cite in this 
regard the case of the Compagnie des fonderies et forges de Terre- 
noire, la Voulte, et Besseges. Reorganized in 1859, infused with 
Lyon money, and refurbished with Bessemer converters, Terrenoire 
had become one of France's largest producers of steel by 1867, at the 
very moment when the domestic market for steel rails-Terrenoire's 
principal product-was contracting.24 As a result, it found itself de- 
pendent on foreign markets, especially in Switzerland and Italy, in 
21 
"La Fabrique lyonnaise de soieries," L'Economistefrancais (uly 5, 1873), pp. 320-23; 
Levasseur, Histoire du commerce, pp. 755-771. 
22 For the position of the textile manufacturers on tariff policy, see Pariset, "La Chambre de 
commerce de Lyon au dix-neuvieme siicle," Memoires de l'Academie de Lyon, XXVII (1890-91), 
1-254; L-J Gras, Histoire de la Chambre de commerce de Saint-Etienne (Saint-Etienne, 1913), pp. 
175-78; and the depositions of the chambers of commerce of Tarare, Saint-Etienne, and Lyon 
to the Chamber Tariff Commission in Journal officiel (May 23, 1878), pp. 5611-15; (May 27, 
1878), pp. 5820-24; (June 22, 1878), pp. 6931-36; (June 28, 1878), pp. 7120-22. 
23 Jean Bouvier, "Aux origines du Cr6dit Lyonnais: le milieu 6conomique et financier 
lyonnais au debut des annees 1860," Histoire des entreprises, VI (November, 1960), 41-64. 
24 L. Babu, "L'industrie m6tallurgique dans la r6gion de Saint-Etienne," Annales des mines, 
ser. 9, XV (1899), 399-420; Comit6 des forges,La Siderurgiefrancaise, 1864-1914 (Paris, n.d.), p. 
142; Deposition of Alexandre Jullien, Conseil superieur du commerce, Admissions temporaires 
(Paris, 1877), pp. 48-49. 
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the early 1870s. In these circumstances the company's head, 
Alexandre Jullien, as a member of the free trade caucus in 1872, 
naturally sought to preserve the trade treaties. To be sure, one must 
note that the economic downturn of the late 1870s would destroy the 
delicate balance of forces which originally brought the mining and 
metallurgical interests of the Loire and the southern Massif into the 
free trade movement and that consequently Alexandre Jullien, 
among others, would defect to the protectionist camp after 1877. 
Nevertheless, up until that time the metallurgists, along with most 
other capitalists in the Lyon sphere of influence, continued to support 
the trade treaties and a liberal tariff policy.25 
Beyond Paris and Lyon there was strong support for the eco- 
nomic policy of the Second Empire in the major wine producing and 
wine exporting regions of France, notably in the Cote d'Or and the 
Herault, two departments whose representatives in the Assembly 
voted solidly against renunciation of the trade treaties in 1872, and, 
even more, in the wine region of the Southwest, including the de- 
partments of the Gironde, Lot-et-Garonne, Charente, and 
Charente-Inferieure. Indeed these departments, together with the 
Landes, Gers, Basses- and Hautes-Pyrenees, furnished some thirty- 
six votes in favor of the Johnston motion and thereby constituted a 
bloc within the free trade party equal in size to that of either Paris or 
Lyon. Of course, the center of this region was Bordeaux, which, 
because of its involvement in international trade as France's third 
largest seaport as well as because of its position in the export of wine, 
had long harbored free trade sentiments. It was there that Bastiat, 
Wolowski, and others had launched the first national free trade 
association in 1845. In the 1850s the Bordeaux chamber of commerce 
had lobbied vigorously for tariff liberalization, and in 1860 it had 
offered crucial backing to Chevalier in the negotiation of the treaty 
with England.26 In the early 1870s it remained steadfast in its support 
of the trade treaties,27 while Bordeaux's delegates to the National 
Assembly, especially Nathaniel Johnston, Adrien Bonnet, and duc 
Elie Decazes, emerged as vocal leaders of the free trade caucus. 
Another port city committed to free trade was Marseille. In the 
early 1870s it was France's busiest port, importing East European 
25 L-J Gras, Histoire economique de la metallurgie de la Loire (Saint-Etienne, 1908), pp. 141-48. 
26 Albert Charles, "Le Role du grand commerce bordelais dans l'evolution du systeme 
douanier francais de 1852 a 1860," Revue historique de Bordeaux, IX (1960), 65-88. 27 Chambre de commerce de Bordeaux, Voeux exprimes de 1872 a 1879 au sujet des tarifs 
douaniers, des traites de commerce, du commerce xterieur, et de la marine marchande (Bordeaux, 1880). 
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grain, Algerian ore for the blast furnaces of the Massif, and raw silk 
for the spinners and weavers of the Rh6ne, while exporting Lan- 
guedoc wines and Lyon silks. Just as important, Marseille was becom- 
ing industrialized. Chemical plants, oil distilleries, sugar refineries, 
soapworks, flour mills, iron smelters, tanneries, shipyards,and other 
processing and construction industries were appearing so rapidly as 
to give the city a boom-town atmosphere. "[In] a hundred places, even 
within the city itself which dares not complain," one visitor wrote in 
1877, "clusters of smokestacks taller than obelisks belch forth smoke 
that blackens the sky and fouls the air. All-conquering industry 
spreads everywhere and has overrun the entire coastline."28 Because 
these new industries depended on imported raw materials, Mar- 
seille's rising industrialists relied on strong commercial ties with foreign 
countries and on continuation of low duties on imports just as much 
as did Marseille's established merchant class. Thus, as indicated in the 
public statements of the chamber of commerce,29 virtually all the 
capitalists of the area supported the trade treaties and, reflecting this, 
the legislative delegations of the Bouches-du-Rhone and the Var, led 
by Alexandre Clapier and Adolphe Fraissinet, added their weight to 
the free trade caucus in 1872.30 
The trade treaties received additional support from other 
sources. The worsted and combed wool industries of Reims, Four- 
mies, and Roubaix, in contrast to the domestically oriented woolens 
industries of Elbeuf and Sedan, sent much of their output abroad. 
Indeed, their laine and tissus de laine comprised France's second 
28 Louis Simonin, "Les grands ports de commerce de la France: Marseille et le golfe de 
Lyon," Revue des deux mondes (July 15, 1877), p. 394. 
29 See its responses to the questionnaires of the minister of commerce (1875), the Chamber 
tariff commission (1878), and the Conseil superieur du commerce (1890) in AN F12 2487A, C 
3223, and F12 6916, respectively. 
30 It should be noted that, while Bordeaux and Marseille actively supported free trade, two 
other major ports-Nantes and Le Havre-did not. In the age of steam navigation, Nantes did 
not play the role in maritime commerce that Marseille did; nor did it have a commodity to 
export as Bordeaux did. Rather it was dominated by armateurs and shipbuilders who, in their 
search for government subsidies, became allies of the industrial protectionists in the course of 
the 1870s. Consequently, when its chamber of commerce spoke on commercial policy, it tended 
to oppose free trade. See Louis Simonin, "Les grands ports de commerce de la France: Nantes et 
la bassin de la Loire," Revue des deux mondes (November 15, 1877), pp. 409-36, and the deposition 
of Babin-Chevaye, president of the Nantes chamber of commerce, in Senat, Proces-verbaux de la 
Commission d'enquete, pp. 441-47. 
Unlike Nantes, Le Havre did have a thriving maritime commerce in the 1870s and played 
host to merchants with free trade sentiments. However, as the main port of entry for raw cotton, 
it was closely tied to France's-and especially Normandy's-cotton industry. For fear of under- 
cutting that industry, its chamber of commerce was reluctant to endorse free trade, particularly 
in the realm of manufactures. Simonin, "Les grands ports de la France: Le Havre et le bassin de 
la Seine," Revue des deux mondes (February 15, 1878), pp. 834-72. 
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largest export in 1869. Consequently, the leaders of this industry such 
as Jules Warnier of Reims, deputy for the Marne, resisted the protec- 
tionism typical of the textile industries of northern France and con- 
tinued to support the trade treaties.31 Support came also from certain 
Alsatian industrialists, like Auguste Scheurer-Kestner, who migrated 
to Paris in 1871 and joined the free trade caucus as deputy for the 
Seine, and Gustave Steinheil of Steinheil-Dieterlin of Rothau, who 
migrated a shorter distance and entered the caucus as a deputy for 
the Vosges. Scheurer-Kestner was a free trader partly because of his 
background in the Mulhouse patronat and partly because of his close 
association with Leon Gambetta, but mostly because of personal eco- 
nomic interests. He needed to maintain access to the French market 
for the sulphuric acid he continued to manufacture in Alsace.32 In the 
same vein, Steinheil favored free trade to preserve the arrangment by 
which cloth and yarn manufactured in the Vosges were sent to Alsace 
for finishing and then returned to France for marketing.33 And a 
similar need to maintain economic relationships across newly drawn 
political frontiers undoubtedly accounts for the high degree of sup- 
port for the trade treaties that the deputies of the Meurthe-et-Moselle 
and the Haute-Savoie displayed in the vote on the Johnston motion. 
Finally there was agriculture, both domestic and colonial. With 
agricultural exports continuing to rise in the early 1870s,34 the Societe 
des agriculteurs continued to back the economic policies of the Sec- 
ond Empire, while in the National Assembly representatives of vari- 
ous agricultural departments-the Eure, Oise, Yonne, Maine-et- 
Loire, Indre-et-Loire, Sarthe, Loir-et-Cher-stood with the agricul- 
tural economist, Fran:ois Ducuing, deputy for the Hautes-Pyrenees 
and a member of the free trade caucus, in support of the trade 
treaties. So, too, did the delegates of France's overseas possessions, 
31 As a center of cotton spinning as well as of wool combing, Roubaix was ambivalent on the 
trade treaties. It is significant, however, thatJules Deregnaucourt, the mayor of Roubaix, voted 
to support Johnston's motion against the renunciation of the treaties in 1872 and was the only 
deputy of the Nord to do so. 
32 Testimony of Scheurer-Kestner, Chambre des deputes, Commission du tarif general des 
douanes, Proces-verbaux des seances (Paris, 1879), pp. 527-29. 
33 This interdependence of the Vosges and Alsace did not continue for long, however. As 
early as December, 1871, a joint-stock company was formed by Vosgian and Alsatian indus- 
trialists, led by Steinheil, to undertake the transfer of part of the Alsatian bleaching and dyeing 
industry to Thaon-les-Vosges. When the Blanchisseries et teintureries de Thaon opened its 
doors in 1875, the symbiosis of the two textile industries formally ended, and the previously 
mentioned movement of Vosges textilists, including Steinheil, into the protectionist camp 
accelerated. A. Lederlin, et al., Monographie de l'industrie cotonniere (Epinal, 1905), p. 20. 
34 Agricultural exports were worth 1,179,803,000 francs in 1872, compared to 669,469,000 
francs in 1860. J. Clave, "La Situation agricole de la France," Revue des deux mondes (January 15, 
1880), p. 412. 
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represented in the caucus by Francois de Mahy of Reunion. Algeria, 
Senegal, Guadeloupe, and Martinique, as well as Reunion, had all 
benefitted from the liberalization of the colonial tariff system in 1866. 
Moreover, they all resented the imposition of a tax on denrees coloniales 
in 1871 and feared further attempts to reimpose restrictions on their 
trade with France and other countries. Their representatives were 
therefore virtually unanimous in resisting the renunciation of the 
trade treaties in 1872 as part of a broader effort to uphold the trade 
policy of the Second Empire. 
This analysis of the personnel and interests of the free trade 
party, when compared with the earlier analysis of the protectionists, 
reveals that at the root of the conflict over tariff policy in the early 
Third Republic was a split among divergent economic interests pos- 
sessing correspondingly divergent views on France's future economic 
development and on its proper economic relationship with the rest of 
the world. The free trade party included some ideologues acting on 
the basis of liberal principles. However, free traders were more typi- 
cally capitalists involved in international commerce-the grands 
negociants and financiers of Paris, Lyon, and the ports, railroad and 
shipping magnates, manufacturers and agriculturalists producing 
for export-who not only welcomed the reforms of the 1860s but also 
looked forward to and even depended on the continued integration 
of France into the emerging world market of the late nineteenth 
century. The protectionists, on the other hand, were those 
capitalists-especially certain textile and metallurgical manu- 
facturers-who, for a variety of reasons, could not compete in 
the international market and therefore depended on local or regional 
markets and looked forward to the creation of a truly national market 
in France to serve as a privileged preserve for their production. In 
essence, then, the split between free traders and protectionists was a 
split between outwardly directed commercial capitalists seeking in- 
ternational economic integration and inwardly directed industrial 
capitalists seeking national self-sufficiency. 
In addition to involving a conflict among capitalists with differ- 
ing interests and orientations, the struggle over the tariff also in- 
volved to some extent a conflict between different regions of France. 
The signers of the protectionist interpellations of 1868 and 1869 were 
not drawn from all parts of the country but represented only 
twenty-eight departments which formed, in turn, four distinct clus- 
ters. Five departments of northern France-the Nord, the Somme, 
Pas-de-Calais, Aisne, and Ardennes-constituted one of these clus- 
ters. Another consisted of various departments of Brittany and Nor- 
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mandy, of which the Seine-Inf6rieure was most prominent. Seven 
departments of eastern France-the Bas-Rhin, Haut-Rhin, Moselle, 
Vosges, Doubs, Haute-Saone, and Haute-Marne-made up the third 
cluster. Almost all the other signers of the interpellations came from a 
fourth less well defined cluster of departments scattered across the 
Massif Central from the C6te d'Or to the Aveyron. In contrast, the 
free traders came primarily from the Seine, the Southwest, the 
Southeast, and the colonies, and secondarily from the Center, as the 
vote on the Johnston motion indicated. Their geographic base was thus 
not mutually exclusive with that of the protectionists-there was 
overlap in the Loire, for example-but on the whole it was strikingly 
complementary. (See Figure 1 and Figure 2.) 
This geographical cleavage may have been merely the by- 
product of the way the various interests and enterprises in the free 
trade and protectionist camps happened to be distributed through 
France. But perhaps it amounted to more than that. In this cleavage one 
may well be confronting on the economic level the same split between 
provincial, "small town" France and the cosmopolitan urban com- 
plexes of Paris, Lyon, and the major port cities that was dramatically 
manifested on the political level in the fight between Thiers's "na- 
tional" government and the loosely allied communes of Paris, Lyon, 
and Marseille in 1871.35 In any case, the conflict over the tariff, at the 
very least, reinforced whatever suspicions and rivalries existed 
among the various cities and regions which found themselves on 
opposite sides of the issue in the 1870s. 
It should now be obvious that the contest between the free 
traders and protectionists posed a serious political problem for the 
Third Republic in that it presented a major obstacle to bringing the 
leaders of all regions of France and of all sectors of its economy 
together in a single, national "Republican consensus." Both sides 
represented interests with considerable economic and political clout. 
Any regime which supported one of them at the expense of the 
other-and thus included one in the consensus while excluding the 
other-would necessarily have alienated an important segment of the 
French capitalist community and would have thereby prejudiced its 
chances of survival. By the same token, any regime which could 
35 In Sisters of Liberty: Marseille, Lyon, Paris, and the Reaction to a Centralized State, 1868-1871 
(Cambridge, Mass., 1971), Louis M. Greenberg presents an account of this struggle, focussing 
rather narrowly on the issue of centralization versus decentralization. For insight into the role of 
geographical cleavages in the political and economic development of France in the nineteenth 
century, see Edward W. Fox,History in Geographic Perspective: the Other France (New York, 1971). 
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somehow accommodate both sides and could thus include both in the 
consensus would have taken a giant step toward solidifying its sup- 
port and assuring its long-term existence. It was a triumph for the 
early Third Republic that it consciously or unconsciously pursued 
and ultimately succeeded in the latter course of action. 
By the 1890s, the political leaders of the Third Republic had 
substantially resolved the tariff question in such a way as to accom- 
modate most of the major interests in both the free trade and protec- 
tionist parties, thereby assuring their allegiance to the Republican 
system. Because this process of accommodation proved to be long and 
convoluted, it cannot be recounted in detail here. Suffice it to say that 
it unfolded in two distinct stages. The first stage, 1877-1882, centered 
on the renunciation of the old trade treaties, the legislation of a new 
general tariff, and the negotiation of new trade treaties. It resulted 
less in a compromise than in an outright victory for the free traders. 
Capitalizing on the continued support of agriculture-or at least on 
the inability of industrial protectionists to form a lasting alliance with 
agricultural protectionists-and capitalizing as well on their en- 
trenched position in government,36 the free traders overcame the 
growing parliamentary strength of the protectionists and in 1881 won 
approval of a moderate general tariff that substituted duties based on 
the conventional duties in the trade treaties for the prohibitory duties 
remaining on the books from the pretreaty era. Then, in gaining 
ratification of new trade treaties, they replaced all of those duties, 
except those on agricultural products, with a new conventional tariff 
which by and large perpetuated the duties in effect since 1860. In this 
manner, the reforms of 1881-82, far from re-establishing pro- 
tection-as most textbooks still suggest they did-actually ex- 
36 Free traders held at least one of the three cabinet posts most influential in the making of 
commercial policy-finance, commerce and agriculture, and foreign affairs-in every govern- 
ment between 1873 and 1882, while none of these posts was ever held by an active protectionist 
in the same period. The most prominent of the "ministerial" free traders in this era were three 
veterans of the free trade caucus: duc Elie Decazes, who served as foreign minister continuously 
from November 1873 to November 1877; Leon Say, France's only finance minister from March 
1875 to December 1879 (except for the brief tenure of Eugene Caillaux, another alumnus of the 
caucus, in the Seize Mai cabinet); and Pierre Tirard, minister of commerce and agriculture from 
March 1879 to July 1882, but for the hiatus of Gambetta's "Grande Ministere." 
In addition to the free traders' domination of ministerial positions, it must be noted that 
most of the career civil servants who ran the bureaux of the various ministries in the 1870s and 
many other government experts (who were often more influential in the making of policy than 
the ministers, themselves) were products of, and holdovers from, the Second Empire and were 
sympathetic to its policies. This was the case, for example, with Jules Ozenne, secretary of the 
commerce ministry and director of foreign trade, and Leon Ame, directeur general des douanes 
and the government's top advisor on tariffs. Both insisted that tariffs could still be used as a 
source of revenue but should not serve to stifle trade or unduly protect domestic industry. See 
Leon Am6, Etude sur les tarifs de douane et sur les traitks de commerce 2 vols. (Paris, 1876), I, 531-34. 
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FIGURE 1 
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF PROTECTIONISTS 
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Sources: Requests for interpellations on the trade treaties, 1868 and 1869; Journal des 
economistes, May, 1868, pp. 315-16; Journal officiel de I'Empirefranfais, December 15, 1869, p. 
1628. 
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FIGURE 2 
THE GEOGRAPHIC DISTRIBUTION OF FREE TRADERS 
IN THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY 
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tended the free trade system of the Second Empire for ten more 
years.37 
Unfortunately for the free traders, they were not able to preserve 
this victory in the midst of changing economic and political circum- 
stances at home and abroad after 1882. For one thing, in response to 
economic depression more and more countries in Europe and 
worldwide were renouncing their commercial conventions in the 
1880s in order to return to high protection, and this inevitably under- 
cut the free trade system in France. After all, trade treaties-the 
backbone of free trade in the nineteenth century-could not be 
maintained unilaterally. Secondly, within France, the balance of in- 
terests, which had tended to favor the free traders in the 1870s, became 
increasingly favorable to the protectionists in the 1880s, when in- 
terests once committed to free trade, especially in agriculture, 
switched sides in the face of mounting foreign competition, and the 
place of the remaining free trade interests in the French economy- 
for reasons which cannot be dealt with here-declined relative to that 
of protectionist interests.38 Finally, the free traders' erstwhile 
monopoly of policy-making positions in government disappeared 
when provincial protectionists, increasingly at home in Paris and in 
the parliamentary system, began to accede to cabinet posts in the 
1880s. For example, the ministries of commerce and agriculture, 
which remained in free trade hands from 1873 to 1882, fell into the 
37 Comprehending the meaning of the tariff reform of 1881-82 depends on comparing the 
general and conventional duties in effect from 1860 to 1880, found in Jules Clere, Les tarifs de 
douane. Tableaux comparatifs (Paris, 1880), with the duties established by the general tariff of 
1881 and the trade treaties of 1882, found in Bulletin de statistique et de legislation comparee, XI 
(1882), 502ff. 
It must be noted that the protectionists did get some benefits from the reforms of 1881-82. 
In addition to exempting agricultural duties from the trade conventions and thus allowing 
higher agricultural duties to be legislated as the need arose, the new system converted all ad 
valorem duties to fixed "specific" duties-that is to say, henceforth French duties were to remain 
constant, instead of fluctuating with prices. This meant that, in an era of falling prices, the 
import price (price at port of entry plus import duty) of goods coming into France would fall 
more gradually than world prices in general, which in turn meant that domestic producers 
would get more of a buffer against falling world prices and more protection against foreign 
competition under the new system than they would have gotten under the ad valorem system. 
This, of course, was not as beneficial as a direct increase in the level of import duties, but it was 
better than nothing. 38 This changing balance is revealed in what happened to tissus de soie, the foremost free 
trade manufacture, andfi/ s de coton, the foremost protectionist commodity. As indicated in T.J. 
Markovitch's table XVI (Cahiers de l'I.S.E.A., AF VI [June, 1966]), the value of the average 
annual production of tissus de soie (exceeded that offifl s de coton in 1865-74,461 million francs to 
451 million francs. In the succeeding period, however, the two were even: the average annual 
production of both declined to 291 million francs. Then, in 1885-94,fils de coton forged 
ahead-330 million francs versus 295 million francs-and it would remain ahead thereafter. So, 
whereas silk cloth had greater economic importance in the 1860s and 1870s (in terms of the 
value of its production), cotton spinning had become more important by the 1880s and 1890s. 
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hands of avowed protectionists, such as Pierre Legrand, Auguste 
Dautresme, and Jules Meline, with growing frequency after 1882. 
Aided by all these developments, the protectionists thus succeeded in 
the second stage of the tariff battle in replacing both the general tariff 
of 1881 and the conventional tariff of 1882 with a sterner two-tiered 
schedule of duties embodied in the so-called Meline tariff of 1892. 
Historians have invariably seen the Meline tariff as the final step in 
the inevitable return to protection in France after the fall of the 
Second Empire. While the Meline tariff did represent a definite swing 
away from the free trade policy of 1860-82 toward protection, it is 
important to note that the new tariff did not return France to the 
pre-1860 system of prohibitory duties but, in fact, represented, espe- 
cially in the realm of industrial tariffs, something of a compromise 
between the interests of protectionists and free traders (although the 
exultation of the former and the lamentations of the latter in 1891-92 
have obscured this point). The new law raised duties on most agricul- 
tural products, most finished consumer goods, and those semi- 
finished goods, such as jute, linen, and cotton yarn and cloth, pro- 
duced by industries reputed to be particularly hard pressed by for- 
eign competitors. However, duties remained the same on many other 
producer and consumer goods, including coal and coke, most forms 
of iron and steel, and woolens (that is, the new minimum duty on 
these items equalled the old conventional duty). Moreover, even in 
cases where protection was increased, the law often provided 
loopholes to benefit big domestic importers. Thus the system of 
admissions temporaires, whereby duties were refunded on imported 
goods which served as raw materials for the manufacture of export 
goods, was maintained on all items to which it had previously applied, 
including wheat. This preserved the position of the Marseille milling 
industry, which had depended on the importation of east European 
grain since its founding in the 1860s. A similar arrangement, allowing 
60 per cent of the duty on cotton yarn to be refunded if it were used to 
make cloth for export, saved the ribbon and tissus melanges manufac- 
turers of the Rhone and Loire from the full effects of increased 
protection for French cotton spinners.39 
This compromise was in part an unplanned and unforeseen 
product of the give-and-take of rival interests in the parliamentary 
arena in 1890-91. But it was also a product of the conscious desire of 
both business leaders operating from below and national political 
39 For the various articles of the tariff law, plus the schedule of duties, see the Bulletin de 
statistique et de legislation comparee, XXXI (1892), 12-34, 187ff. 
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leaders operating from above to find the middle ground between 
absolute free trade and ironclad protection and to avoid the kind of 
one-sided (and thus politically dangerous) solution to the tariff ques- 
tion embodied in the reforms of 1881-82. This desire for compromise 
and accommodation was manifested as early as 1878, when theSleaders 
of the Saint-Etienne and Marseille chambers of commerce, because of 
the nature of the interests under their tutelage, demanded a measure 
of protection for some producers but, at the same time, recom- 
mended the maintenance of the existing trade treaties.40 More im- 
portantly, the Freycinet government and especially its minister of 
commerce, Jules Roche, exhibited this desire in guiding the tariff bill 
through parliament in 1891. As Roche later asserted, it was the 
government's intention "to conciliate, as much as possible, the diverse 
interests present" in the matter of the tariff. "France," he continued, 
"is at once an agricultural, manufacturing, and commercial country, 
and it is important for the development of its national genius as well as 
for its [national] strength to sacrifice none of the major elements of its 
life and prosperity."41 
The success of this effort to strike a balance between free trade 
and protection and thereby to accommodate all parties to the issue is 
attested not only by the stipulations of the tariff law and by the 
self-congratulatory statements of its architects, but also by the survival 
and continued prosperity of all the major interests and, more clearly 
still, by the abatement of the long struggle between free traders and 
protectionists after 1892. To be sure, disagreements on tariff policy 
did not completely disappear. However, they no longer monopolized 
the attention of the interests as they had from 1860 to 1892. Having 
achieved a workable compromise, those formerly divided between 
the free trade and protectionist blocs increasingly cooperated in 
ventures of mutual benefit, such as colonial expansion. Moreover, 
they joined together in successfully defending the Republic, which 
now guaranteed the economic position of all of them, against the 
menace of those excluded from the Republican consensus, urban 
workers in particular. In this manner, the tariff, which had been an 
obstacle to the creation of the Republican synthesis for twenty years, 
became a key factor in preserving that synthesis well into the twen- 
tieth century. 
40 See the depositions of the Marseille and Saint-Etienne chambers of commerce to the 
Chamber tariff commission (1878) in AN C 3223 and C 3224, respectively. 
41 Address at Marseille, October 9, 1891, in Chambre de commerce de Marseille, Compte- 
rendu des travaux pour l'annee 1891 (Marseille, 1892), p. 369. 
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